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I.

INTRODUCTION
Zoning is an integral part of nearly every American community. The main purpose of

zoning regulation is to promote orderly community development. Zoning accomplishes this
purpose by imposing a variety of restrictions on location, size, and types of land use. Continued
population growth and urban development have made zoning essential to balance public and
private property interests.1 Communities adopt growth limits from a variety of motives. Such
incentives may include conservationists genuinely interested to preserve general or specif ic
environments, social exclusionism, racial exclusion, racial discrimination, income segregation,
fiscal protection, or just fear of any future change; each of these are purposes well served by growth
prevention. Whatever the motivation, total exclusion of people from a community is both immoral
and illegal.

2

The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (also commonly known as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, hereinafter the “Act”) had aimed to remediate race-based housing exclusion.3 However,
it did not address economic discrimination in housing. 4

Because people of color are

disproportionately low-income, economic segregation achieves many of the same outcomes as
explicit race-based exclusion.5 Such de facto segregation is no better for its targets than purposeful

1

24 AM. JUR. 3 D Proof of Facts 543 (Originally published in 1994).
Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976).
3 THE FAIR H OUSING ACT , 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1968); See also Paula A. Franzese & Stephanie J. Beach,
Promises Still to Keep: The Fair Housing Act Fifty Years Later, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1207 (2019) (noting that the
Fair Housing Act “aimed to undo the shameful legacy of de jure and de facto race -based housing discrimination”).
4 Elizabeth Winkler, ‘Snob Zoning’ is Racial Housing Segregation by Another Name, WASH.
POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/25/snobzoning-is-racial-housingsegregation-by-another-name/?utm_term=.4174ba73b19f (“There is no class-based version of the Fair Housing
Act—that is, no federal legislation that says economic exclusion is improper.”).
5 Richard D. Kahlenberg, Opinion, The Walls We Won't Tear Down, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/opinion/sunday/zoning-laws-segregation-income.html.
2
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de jure segregation.6 The impact has been devastating for generations of minorities who were
denied the right to live where they wanted to live, and raise and school their children where they
could flourish most successfully —leading to the powder keg that has defined Ferguson,
Baltimore, Charleston, and Chicago.
In response to the Act, in the early 1970s the courts were moving rapidly towards a major
reversal in the law on exclusionary zoning directed against lower-income groups, and the
promotion of affordable housing.7 The three big Middle Atlantic states—New York, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania, took the lead on this. Their approach culminated in the Mount Laurel doctrine,
while other areas of the country have implemented alternative solutions.
The Mount Laurel doctrine8 , a legal principle set forth in a series of New Jersey Supreme
Court rulings, is among the most significant contributions ever made to the advancement of
affordable housing. In these rulings, the New Jersey Supreme Court implicitly declared housing to
be a fundamental right 9 and imposed an affirmative obligation on municipalities to provide a

6

Paula A. Franzese & Stephanie J. Beach, Promises Still to Keep: The Fair Housing Act Fifty Years Later, 40
CARDOZO L. REV. 1207, 1208 (2019)
7 Introduction, 3 American Land Planning Law § 68:1 (Rev. Ed.).
8 The Mount Laurel doctrine emanates from a series of cases: S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp., 336
A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter “Mount Laurel I”]; S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp., 456 A.2d
390 (N.J. 1983) [hereinafter “Mount Laurel II”]; Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Twp. in Somerset Cnty., 510 A.2d 621
(N.J. 1986) [hereinafter “Mount Laurel III”]; and In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 ex rel. New Jersey Council
on Affordable Housing, 110 A.3d 31 (N.J. 2015), [hereinafter “Mount Laurel IV”] (collectively “Mount Laurel”).
9 See generally John M. Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of Mount Laurel II, 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 555 (2000) (Mount Laurel II court effectively declares a constitutional right to shelter under the New Jersey
Constitution). However, the Mount Laurel court could not point to any specific provision in the state constitution to
support a finding that there is a constitutional right to affordable housing. Id. at 564–65. In notable contrast,
however, in the same year, the same justices concluded a specific provision within the New Jersey Constitution
supported a finding of a constitutionally protected right to a “thorough and efficient” education. See Robinson v.
Cahill, 351 A.2d 713, 720 (N.J. 1975).
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“realistic opportunity” 10 for a fair share of the state’s need for affordable housing. 11 In doing so,
the court recognized poverty as a factor in the constitutional inquiry. 12 In effect, the court went
beyond what any state or federal court had done prior to 1975 or has done since in this area of the
law.
Nevertheless, municipalities have strong incentives to resist the construction of affordable
housing in their jurisdictions. Critics view the Mount Laurel doctrine as contradictory to sound
planning principals, a catalyst for urban sprawl, environmentally precarious, and financially
burdensome to ill-equipped local budgets.13 Thus, for years, powerful forces within the state kept
New Jersey from making progress in the fight to address the affordable-housing crisis, claiming
that expanding opportunities for low-income families and breaking down barriers of racial
exclusion would somehow hurt middle-class families.14 Instead, we are learning that our
communities thrive when we redevelop blighted office parks and empty strip malls into spirited

Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724–25. By use of the phrase “realistic opportunity,” the court did not impose on
municipalities an obligation to provide a fair share of housing, but to create the opportun ity to do so. Payne’s article
emphasizes that the effect of these words is to make the doctrine less strict or harsh, and other scholars have written
on the subject as well. The language is also supported by its repeated use in Mount Laurel II. See, e.g., Mount Laurel
II, 456 A.2d at 442 (“Once a municipality has revised its land use regulations and taken other steps affirmatively to
provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of its fair share of lower income housing, the Mount Laurel
doctrine requires it to do no more.”).
11 Id. However, the Court makes it clear that it does not intend to prescribe remedies to effectuate its bold ruling, and
that the mandate would not affirmatively require suburban municipalities to produce affordable housing. See, e.g.,
Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 442 (“Once a municipality has revised its land use regulations and taken other steps
affirmatively to provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of its fair share of lower income housing, the
Mount Laurel doctrine requires it to do no more.”).
12 Robert C. Holmes, The Clash of Home Rule and Affordable Housing: The Mount Laurel Story Continues, 12
CONN. PUB. I NT. L.J. 325, 326 (2013) (Recognition of poverty as a relevant consideration in the inquiry regarding
Mount Laurel compliance does not necessarily raise poverty to a protected class, but only to a relevant consideration
in determining whether the realistic opportunity test has been met).
13 See DANIEL C ARLSON & SHASHIR M ATHUR, Does Growth Management Aid or Thwart the Provision of Affordable
Housing? GROWTH M ANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE H OUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 20, 45-46 (Anthony Downs
ed., 2004) (stating that, “There is a widespread public perception that the state’s affordable housing policy is a cause
of urban sprawl”).
14 George T. Vallone, Affordable Housing: Familiar Problem, New Challenges, M ULTI -H OUSING NEWS (July 30,
2020), https://www.multihousingnews.com/post/affordable-housing-the-same-problems-only-worse/
10
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mixed-use communities that reduce sprawl and increase affordability with diverse housing options
that include apartments and starter homes.15
Part I of this paper will discuss the systematic segregation in housing that led to the Fair
Housing Act and Mount Laurel doctrine. Part II will lay out the development and execution of the
Mount Laurel doctrine, beginning with Mount Laurel I viewed through the lens that economic
exclusion is racial exclusion. Part III will then examine the benefits and burdens of two separate
approaches to compliance. On one hand, a legislative scheme that sets up an executive agency
which allows municipalities to decide how and where to permit construction of affordable housing
within their boundaries, versus a judicial scheme that for all intents and purposes allows courts to
decide how and where affordable housing will be built within a municipality.

II.

PART ONE

In New Jersey, the exclusionary zoning tradition developed in the 1950s and early 1960s
relied upon several propositions. First, that the statutory power to zone for the “general welfare”
grants municipalities with broad powers to control land use to achieve a variety of objectives; and
this power should be interpreted as referring to the welfare of each municipality as a separate
unit.16 It was also established that “fiscal zoning,” to improve a municipality's position on tax
ratables, is an appropriate goal under this police-power action.17 Further, that “the vague phrases
deriving from the end of Section 3 of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act—conservation of property

15

Douglas Massey, Learning from Mount Laurel, SHELTERFORCE (Oct. 10, 2012),
shelterforce.org/2012/10/10/learning_from_mount_laurel/ (finding that Mount Laurel's Ethel Lawrence homes were
an “unequivocal success”).
16 An affirmative (and negative) municipal duty on access to housing —In New Jersey—The exclusionary tradition, 3
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 68:4 (Rev. Ed.).
17 Id.
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values, taking into consideration the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for
particular uses, and encouraging the most appropriate use of land —represent a separate and
additional grant of municipal power, and serve to justify exclusionary zoning.”18 Finally, the
traditional zoning also relied upon a concept of “balanced zoning”—which, in practice, turns out
to eliminate multiple dwellings.19
As zoning laws first developed, New Jersey courts upheld a broad range of potentially
exclusionary techniques and ordinances.

These decisions include prohibitions against any

apartment buildings in practically an entire community, 20 against increasing the number of
dwelling units in apartments above about 10% of the total, 21 against any small houses,22 against
homes on less than five-acre lots in most of a township,23 and even against any mobile homes.24
These opinions upheld backward-looking principles under the traditional concept of “balanced
zoning.”
However, in the last of these cases (involving mobile homes) Justice Frederick Hall wrote
a dissent focused upon the development of the prohibitive tradition that had become suburban
exclusionary zoning.25 His dissent is widely regarded as the best of modern zoning opinions.26 In
it, Justice Hall noted that the court’s holding gave almost boundless freedom to developing

18

Id.
Id.
20 Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 11 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 1951).
21 Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320 (1958).
22 Lionshead Lake v. Wayne Twp., Passaic County, 10 N.J. 165 (1952).
23 Fischer v. Bedminster Twp., 11 N.J. 194 (1952).
24 Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester Twp., 181 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1962) (overruled by, Mount Laurel II)
(the Southern Burlington court rendered absolute bans of mobile homes no longer permissible on grounds of adverse
effect on real estate values).
25 See id.; An affirmative (and negative) municipal duty on access to housing —In New Jersey—The Vickers dissent,
3 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 68:5 (Rev. Ed.).
26 Id.
19
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municipalities and opened the door for the municipalities to use their zoning powers for aims
beyond its legitimate purposes.27 He reasoned that
[L]egitimate use of the zoning power by such municipalities does not encompass
the right to erect barricades on their boundaries through exclusion or too tight
restriction of uses where the real purpose is to prevent feared disruption with a socalled chosen way of life…[n]or does it encompass provisions designed to let in as
new residents only certain kinds of people, or those who can afford to live in
favored kinds of housing, or to keep down tax bills of present property owners.28
Justice Hall further cautioned “[t]he majority's view could as well support exclusion of modernistic
dwelling architecture, split level homes, or even whole developments of identical houses if a bare
majority of the township committee does not like their looks.” 29
Shortly thereafter, the winds began to shift. In 1973 a Rhode Island court noted that the
test used to determine whether an ordinance is a legitimate exercise of the police power is whether
there exists a reasonable relationship between the ordinance and protecting the public health,
safety, morals and welfare - and held that restrictions intended to protect the community's tax base
were improper.30 Then, in 1975, in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, the New York Court of
Appeals announced a two-part test for municipal zoning ordinances challenged as being
exclusionary.31 The court held that a proper ordinance should: (1) provide for a “balanced [and]
cohesive community;” and (2) take into consideration regional, as well as local, housing needs.32

27

Vickers, 181 A.2d at 140-41.
Id.
29 Id.
30 Town of Glocester v. Olivo's Mobile Home Court, Inc., 300 A.2d 465 (R.I. 1973).
31 Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 241 -42 (N.Y. 1975).
32 Id.
28
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Nevertheless, the court qualified the latter requirement by holding that a municipality need not
meet a “fair share” standard when the regional need for low and moderate-income housing is
satisfied elsewhere.33
Other major states, including California, joined New York in endorsing this “regional

general welfare” approach.34 States like Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Illinois, no longer permitted
municipalities to exclude multifamily housing completely and required that they provide for their
“fair share” of various housing types.35 Meanwhile, Massachusetts continued to implement (and
support) its “antisnob-zoning” law.36 While courts in Connecticut and Maine suggested the
exclusionary problem may have to be addressed, though not going so far as to overturn any
ordinances.37 Surely, the Justices sitting on the Supreme Court of New Jersey were aware of this
turning tide when they sat to hear and decide Mount Laurel at this kairotic moment in our history.
The development of public policy in other critical areas also cast considerable light on the
implications of the exclusionary suburban pattern. 38 Indeed, “the Mount Laurel saga resembles, at
least in form, a more prominent line of constitutional decisions.” 39 In Brown v. Board of Education
(hereinafter “Brown I”), the United States Supreme Court held that racial segregation deprived

33

Id. at 242-43.
Associated Home Builders, 557 P.2d at 473.
35 Twp. of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. 1975); Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 302
N.W.2d 146 (Mich. 1981); Oak Park Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Palos Park, Cook Cty., 435 N.E.2d 1265 (Ill. App.
1982).
36 M ASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 40B (West 2020); 760 M ASS. C ODE R EGS. 56.01 (West 2020). Chapter 40B permits a city
or town to plan jointly with other cities or towns to promote development and prosperity within their area. §§ 20
through 23 of Chapter 40B specifically deal with affordable housing, while 760 CMR 56.00 has further advanced
the statutory purposes of M.G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20 through 23 by clarifying the procedures of the expedited review
process, and by otherwise addressing recurring questions of interpretation
37 Zelvin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Windsor, 306 A.2d 151 (C.P. 1973); Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals of Town of Yarmouth, 313 A.2d 741 (Me. 1974).
38 Introduction, 3 American Land Planning Law § 68:1.
39 Joseph Marsico, A Forty-Year Failure: Why the New Jersey Supreme Court Should Take Control of Mount Laurel
Enforcement, 41 SETON H ALL LEGIS. J. 149, 167 (2016).
34
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schoolchildren of their constitutional equal protection rights. 40 A subsequent Brown v. Board of
Education case (hereinafter “Brown II”) remanded each of the consolidated Brown I cases to their
respective District Courts and directed the courts “to take such [action] as [is] necessary and proper
to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties
to these cases.”41 As the arduous process of school desegregation progressed, it became
increasingly obvious that in many areas the primary cause for school segregation is simply the
pattern of segregated occupancy of housing. After all, a segregated residential area, whether no
matter the demographic, is likely to have a segregated school, unless major efforts are made to
prevent this.42
Certainly, the Brown decisions were a recent example of the judiciary recognizing an acute
injustice and constructing a remedy where the political branches had failed ; they were
groundbreaking and the aftereffects were still newsworthy and relevant. For the veteran jurists
tasked to decide Mount Laurel I, Brown could not have been far from mind.43 The same justices
were also in that same year hearing Robinson v. Cahill, a case which mingled the state tax
uniformity clause and the federal equal protection clause, ultimately declaring the system of
financing public schools to be unconstitutional.44
In both Brown and Mount Laurel, the courts heard complaints by minority groups alleging
that government actors had violated their rights. The courts broke ground by recognizing
“fundamental rights” that had not been previously observed. Yet both decisions were politically

40

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
42 Introduction, 3 American Land Planning Law § 68:1.
43 See Holmes, supra, note 12 at 347 (“A case likely in the minds of the Mount Laurel court is Brown v. Bd. of
Education. The court also likely considered familiar adages associated with social change: that rules are not self executing and that a rule change is no good without a political base to support it.” (citations omitted)).
44 Robinson, 351 A.2d 713.
41
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unpopular in most sectors, and enforcement was neither straightforward nor effortless and took
time to achieve.45 Finally, in both cases, the respective legislatures eventually lent their support by
passing statutes to foster compliance: Congress with its Civil Rights Act 46 to, inter alia, promote
integration, and the New Jersey Legislature with its Fair Housing Act 47 to streamline and formalize
the affordable housing mission. Thus, it is reasonable to note that there is a parallel between the
Brown cases and the Mount Laurel cases.

III.

PART II

During the 1960s, a social movement to end institutionalized racial discrimination,
disenfranchisement and racial segregation was growing throughout the United States. Moderates
in the movement worked with the United States Congress to achieve the passage of several
significant pieces of federal legislation that overturned discriminatory laws and practices,
authorizing oversight and enforcement by the federal government. As a result, the separate but
equal policy, which aided the enforcement of Jim Crow laws, was substantially weakened and
eventually dismantled. At the same time, two major development strategies were taking place in
the Mount Laurel region, one in the City of Camden, and the other in its developing suburbs,
including Mount Laurel Township in Burlington County.
In Camden, the policy-makers were trying to utilize urban renewal and highway
construction to rebuild the city. The result was just the opposite: the city’s middle-class residents,

45

Arguably, the actualization of both efforts is intertwined, and the aims of neither decision have been realized to
date, but that is beyond the scope of this note.
46 C IVIL R IGHTS ACT , 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1964).
47 Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT . ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329.19 (West 2020).
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mostly white, left the city for the suburbs, and the poor, financially unable to move out, were
displaced by the government action, “relocated” from one slum to the next and sentenced to reside
in substandard, overpriced housing which became the worst urban ghetto in America.48 Their goal
was to escape Camden to the decent housing, safe neighborhoods, good schools and employment
in the developing suburbs.49
In Mount Laurel Township, development plans were underway. Three “Planned Unit
Developments” (hereinafter “PUDs”), were intended to develop more than 10,000 homes,
industrial parks and commercial centers.50 The result would transform Mount Laurel from
farmland to an affluent suburb. Not even one unit of affordable housing was part of these planned
developments.51 Mount Laurel’s plans were fiscal zoning at its best, aimed at attracting the highest
tax ratables.52 Zoning regulations such as the ones in place create barriers to inclusion by imposing
minimum lot size requirements, requiring aesthetic uniformity, and forbidding builders from
developing apartment buildings or townhouses in certain areas, thereby assuring access only to
those of certain financial means, which translates to excluding the poor.53
Contrasted with this massive development scheme was Mount Laurel’s historic black
community, which had resided in the Township since the Revolutionary War. These families
worked the farms and were of modest means, incomes much below what would be needed to
48

E.g. Top 100 Most Dangerous Cities in the U.S., NEIGHBORHOODSCOUT,
https://www.neighborhoodscout.com/blog/top100dangerous (last visited January 3, 2021) (Ca mden has appeared in
the top ten on this list every year since the lists inception); 10 Most Dangerous U.S. Cities, AMERICAN CITY AND
COUNTY, https://www.americancityandcounty.com/galleries/2020s-10-most-dangerous-u-s-cities/ (last visited
January 3, 2021).
49 Fair Share Housing Center, What is the Mount Laurel Doctrine?, WWW.FAIRSHARE H OUSING.COM ,
https://fairsharehousing.org/mount-laurel-doctrine/ (last visited January 7, 2021 6:33 p.m.).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Richard D. Kahlenberg, AN ECONOMIC FAIR H OUSING ACT , R EPORT R ACE & I NEQUALITY at 3-4 (2017),
https://tcf.org/content/report/economic-fair-housing-act (last visited January 8, 2021).
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purchase one of the new single-family homes planned for Mount Laurel’s three PUDs.54 This is
how entrenched race-based class differences allow economic exclusion to continue “racial
segregation’s ugly work.”55 Because people of color remain of disproportionately lower income
than whites, the absence of affordable housing in more expensive cities and towns achieves many
of the same results as explicit racial zoning.56
While the PUD plans were undergoing the municipal approval process, Mount Laurel
Township stepped up its code enforcement efforts in order to remove its black residents who were
often residing in substandard, dilapidated housing, some of which were “living” in converted
chicken coops.57 As these properties were condemned, the Township ordered the occupants to
vacate. No relocation, as required by state law, was offered to these families. 58 The goal was to get
them out of the Township in order to enhance the PUD marketing plan to “attract predominantly
upper middle-class families and first-class commercial and industrial rateables.”59 Unfortunately,
this type of economic exclusion assures that whole swaths of the working poor and middle class
are unable even to live in convenient proximity to their places of work. 60
Mount Laurel’s longtime black community, facing the prospect of being forced out of the
only community they had ever known, began to organize.61 Ethel R. Lawrence, a daycare teacher,

54

Fair Share Housing Center, supra note 49.
See Kimberly Quick, Exclusionary Zoning Continues Racial Segregation’s Ugly Work, CENTURY FOUND (last
visited December 4, 2020), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/exclusionary-zoningcontinues-racial-segregationsugly-work/?agreed=1.
56 Kahlenberg, supra note 102, at 6.
57 Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 714.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See Alana Semuels, The Barriers Stopping Poor People from Moving to Better Jobs, ATLANTIC,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/geographicmobility -and-housing/542439 (last visited January
7, 2021); see also Emily Dreyfuss, The Year in Housing: The Middle Class Can’t Afford to Live in Cities Anymore ,
WIRED (Dec. 31, 2020, https://www.wired.com/2016/12/year-housing-middle-class-cant-afford-livecities-anymore/.
61 Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 716.
55
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wife, mother of nine, church leader and member of the Burlington County Community Action
program (“B.C.C.A.P.”, the anti-poverty program), organized an effort in November 1969 to
petition Mount Laurel Township’s zoning board to permit the development of thirty affordable
garden apartments by a non-profit group.62 This proposal would create relocation housing within
the Township for displaced families. Mount Laurel Township officials doggedly opposed the
proposal, and resulted in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
(Mount Laurel I).63
In Mount Laurel I, the justices determined that Mount Laurel Township’s zoning ordinance
was invalid because it unlawfully excluded low and moderate-income families from the
municipality.64 The justices reasoned that the state could only exercise its police power

65

(for

example, the power to regulate land use through zoning ordinances) to promote public health,
safety, morals, or the general welfare.66 The justices also stated that all police power enactments,
whether state or local enactments, must conform to the basic state constitutional requirements of
substantive due process and equal protection. 67 Accordingly, the Mount Laurel I court determined
that because all local power to zone comes from the State Enabling Act, and the state delegates the
power to municipalities, the police power must reflect the general welfare of the state as a whole,
and is thus not limited to the municipality itself.68 Thus, the definition of “general welfare” must

62

Fair Share Housing Center, supra note 49.
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 713.
64 Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 731.
65 See generally Mount Laurel I, 336 A. 2d 713. The police power as used herein does not refer to law enforcement,
but to the fundamental power vested in states to govern, including making and enforcing laws. Controlled by state
constitutions and other limitations, such as due process, this power must be exercised for the protection and
preservation of public health, justice, morals, order, safety, and the general welfare of the state's inhabitants. Police
power can be delegated to local units of government. (quotations omitted).
66 Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 725.
67 Id.
68 Id.
63
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include the welfare of those outside the municipal borders as well as those inside. 69 Furthermore,
the court determined that the provision of adequate housing for low and moderate-income citizens
is an “absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use
regulation.”70 Thereafter, having invalidated Mount Laurel Township’s exclusionary zoning
ordinance, the court went on to make the Mount Laurel doctrine applicable to all of the state’s
municipalities.71 However, while Mount Laurel I sought to resolve the problems of exclusion by
requiring that each developing community make possible the development of its fair share of the
regional need for affordable housing ‒through its land use controls‒ it actually complicated them
through the failure to specify the remedial obligation and the definitions established.
Thus, the decision was essentially impotent. 72 Many towns openly refused to enforce it,
and even Mount Laurel itself refused to implement the doctrine bearing its name, and so the matter
reappeared before the Supreme Court of New Jersey almost ten years later.73 At that time, the court
observed:
After all this time, ten years after the trial court’s initial order invalidating its
zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly
exclusionary ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired
experts, the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel’s
determination to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel is not alone; we believe that

69

Id.
Id. at 727.
71 See, e.g., Id. at 728 (“It has to follow that, broadly speaking, the presumptive obligation arises for each such
municipality affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable opportunity for an
appropriate variety and choice of housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the needs,
desires and resources of all categories of people who may desire to live within its boundaries.”); See also Holmes,
supra, note 12 at 360.
72 See, e.g., Henry L. Kent-Smith, The Council on Affordable Housing and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Will the
Council Succeed?, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 933 (1987) (arguing that Mount Laurel I failed to produce low cost
housing); Paula A. Franzese, Mount Laurel III: The New Jersey Supreme Court's Judicious Retreat, 18 SETON H ALL
L. REV. 30, 32 (1988) (arguing tha t little had changed in the eight years between Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel
II); Alan Mallach, From Mount Laurel to Molehill: Blueprint for Delay, 15 N.J. REP. 4, 21 (1985) (noting that eight
years after Mount Laurel I no affordable housing had yet been built in Mount Laurel Township).
73 Mount Laurel II, 510 A.2d at 410.
70
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there is widespread non-compliance with the constitutional mandate of our
original opinion in this case.74
With Mount Laurel II, the Supreme Court of New Jersey resolved that “[t]o the best of our
ability, we shall not allow [this delay] to continue.” 75 The court was “more firmly committed to
the original Mount Laurel I doctrine than ever, and [it was] determined, within appropriate judicial
bounds, to make it work.”76 This time, the court increased the obligation to actually make
affordable housing available either through use of mobile homes, subsidies, development
incentives such as density bonuses, tax incentives, and conceivably rent skewing, where the
subsidy for affordable units of housing was supplied by raising the price of unsubsidized units
within a development, or by the mandatory set-aside of a percentage of units in new developments
for affordable housing.77
Further, Mount Laurel II made the doctrine enforceable by giving developers an incentive
to initiate exclusionary zoning suits.78 This incentive came to be known as the “builder’s
remedy.”79 When a builder proposes a development that includes affordable housing and a
municipality denies the proposal for violating local zoning codes, the developer may challenge the
denial in court, asserting that the municipality has not complied with the Mount Laurel doctrine.80
The court designated Mount Laurel specialty judges to hear disputes81 , and ordered that the state

74

Id.
Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 419.
78 Id. at 418, 429-30.
79 Id. at 418, 452-53.
80 Id.
81 New Jersey—Mount Laurel doctrine, 2 R ATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 22:17 (4th ed.)
(Determination of a municipality's fair share of regional lower income housing needs will be made by one of three
trial judges selected by the chief justice and approved by the full court. It is expected th at the use of specially
designated judges will help to ensure consistency and predictability of rules, and will allow the selected judges to
develop the special expertise and knowledge called for by future Mount Laurel litigation.).
75
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planning agency's definition of region and “fair share” (the amount of affordable housing each
New Jersey municipality was required to provide to comply with the Mount Laurel doctrine) be
utilized.82 If a court determines that the municipality has not complied, the court may permit the
developer to construct the project despite violations to the local zoning code and invalidate the
offending zoning provision for excluding affordable housing. 83
After Mount Laurel I, constitutional compliance was at the discretion of each town. Now,
the courts themselves became an effective enforcement instrument, supplying a “special litigation
track for exclusionary zoning cases and . . . a ‘builder’s remedy’ by which builders could file suit
for the opportunity to construct housing at higher densities than a municipality otherwise would
allow.”84 The court had “learned from experience . . . that unless a strong judicial hand is used,
Mount Laurel will not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals.” 85
Nonetheless, the flood of “builder’s remedy” litigation that followed Mount Laurel II
triggered a movement to get the courts out of the practice of land use planning and eventually
caused the New Jersey State Legislature to pass the Fair Housing Act of 1985.86 The main purpose
of the Act was to reassess the fair share allocations assigned to the affected communities, to get
these communities out of court, and to provide a funding mechanism so that low- and moderateincome housing could be viable without the “builder's remedy.”87 If a trial court found that a
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municipality has failed to meet its Mount Laurel obligation, the court would order the town to
revise its ordinance in 90 days. 88
New Jersey’s Fair Housing Act in turn created a state agency to promulgate guidelines and
oversee administration, the Council on Affordable Housing (hereinafter “COAH”).89 COAH was
now responsible for determining the municipalities’ “fair share.”90 COAH would be required to:
(1) enact regulations that establish and update statewide affordable housing need; (2) assign each
municipality an affordable housing obligation for its designated region; and (3) identify the
delivery techniques available to municipalities in addressing the assigned obligation. 91 Further, the
Fair Housing Act permitted municipalities to seek certification from COAH to show that they had
substantially complied with the Mount Laurel doctrine.92 Participating municipalities would file a
Fair Share Housing Plan with COAH, and this process insulated the municipality from builders’
remedy suits.93
The “builder's remedy” available under the Mount Laurel doctrine was initially available
in limited circumstances after the creation of COAH, but was later eliminated under COAH's
regulations if a municipality's fair share plan remained in effect. 94 The Fair Housing Act also
permitted communities to transfer their cases to a nine-member Council on Affordable Housing.95
Trial courts hearing Mount Laurel cases not transferred to the Council on Affordable Housing
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must nevertheless use the fair share methodology employed by the Council unless found arbitrary
and capricious; and only the Appellate Division had the power to invalidate the regulations.96
In Mount Laurel III, numerous municipalities challenged the Act’s constitutionality under
the Mount Laurel mandate. Despite criticism that the new Act institutionalized delay and did not
provide enough recourse, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act.97
While recognizing that the attack on the statute was substantial, the court dismissed it as pure
speculation, and conveyed its preference for legislative action. 98 The court supported the
Legislature’s intent to move affordable housing issues away from the judiciary, however, the court
cautioned that it remained firmly committed to the original Mount Laurel I doctrine, and would
not hesitate to intervene should it become clear that the legislature could not deliver. 99
The new enforcements of the doctrine had some success.100 Reports indicate that 95% of
participants that moved ended up in a community with higher median income than where they
lived prior to moving to their current housing but that moves to COAH-generated housing tended
to concentrate participating households, with 41% of all movers concentrated in just five
municipalities.101 Surveys of those who moved indicated that respondents were far more likely to
report being better off financially in their new community than where they lived previously, but
“given that access to employment has been a consistent focal point of debates around COAH and
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97 Mount Laurel III, 510 A.2d 621 at 632; Henry L. Kent-Smith, supra, note 57, at 945; see also Paula A. Franzese,
supra note 76 at 40.
98 Mount Laurel III, 510 A.2d at 643; Kent-Smith, supra, note 76; see also Franzese, supra, note 76.
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the Mount Laurel doctrine, it was unexpected to learn that most residents surveyed did not include
access to employment as a motive for participation.”102 A large majority of respondents reported
feeling very safe in their current residence, with approximately half of the residents reported
feeling safer than in their prior location and only a very small percentage feeling less safe than
previously.103
Almost half of surveyed households that had children at home listed access to schools (or
better schools) as one of their reasons for moving.104 A very large majority (85%) of these
households with children reported that access to schools was “very good ,” and while most of these
households with children reported that access to schools did not change when they moved, more
than one-third (35%) of these households reported that access to schools improved and this was
approximately four times the number of households that reported a decline in access (8%).105
Additionally, by and large the residents surveyed reported having been able to maintain and extend
their social networks, with 31% of households having more friends in their new community than
in their prior one ‒a figure that tended to increase as residents lived in their new community for a
longer period‒ and a large majority of residents surveyed reported that they were able to maintain
contact with friends from their prior location 106 This is despite the fact that more than one-third of
residents report declining access to public transportation associated with their move to COAH
housing.107 Overall there were very high levels of satisfaction among participants that moved:
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A substantial majority of affordable housing residents surveyed tell us that: they
like where they live; they like their housing units better than where they lived
before; and, they like their new communities better than their old ones. Given the
opportunity to move, a majority of respondents said they would prefer to stay where
they are.108
In 1987, the Council first adopted specific rules for determining a municipality’s affordable
housing obligation, known as the First Round Rules.109 In 1993, the Second Round Rules were
adopted, which were similar to the first, but took into account changes in census data. 110 The rules
“applied a complex formula that took into account vacant land area, employment growth, and
income distribution to come up with a firm, and sometimes seemingly highly arbitrary number for
each municipality.”111
When the time came to issue Third Round Rules, COAH changed the method of calculation
to one which relied on a given municipalities “growth share,” a rehabilitation share, and any
unsatisfied prior round obligations.112 The growth share tied affordable housing obligations to the
net increase in the number of jobs and housing units a municipality would experience between
2004 and 2014.113 This new methodology was highly criticized for deterring municipalities from
expanding, since under the new regulations, housing obligations were determined by the amount
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of homes and jobs created.114 Furthermore, while the criteria set out by COAH was inherently
designed to address a municipality’s need for affordable housing; the rules had various “loopholes”
that prevented inclusion.115
Specifically, under the rules, municipalities could reduce the number of affordable housing
units they were required to provide through the use of “credits.” 116 In addition, up to twenty-five
percent of a municipality’s required affordable housing could be satisfied through age-restrictive
affordable housing.117 In other words, senior housing units could satisfy affordable housing, a
circumstance that discriminates against low-income families with children118 Still, perhaps most
devastatingly, “the FHA gave COAH discretion to approve townships' efforts to buy their way out
of their Mount Laurel duty by transferring up to fifty percent of the given municipality's affordable
housing obligation to a designated receiving municipality to use to build affordable housing within
their borders.”119 These Regional Contribution Agreements (hereafter “RCA's”) frustrated the
primary intention of economic integration and the creation of affordable housing opportunities in
municipalities otherwise closed to whole segments of the population. 120 Most often the receiving
municipalities were found in older urban areas achieved the very opposite of the intended effect
Eamonn K. Bakewell, Foreclosure of a Dream: The Impact of the Council on Affordable Housing’s New
Regulations on the Constitutional Duty to Provide Affordable Housing in New Jersey , 2 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
310, 320-21 (2005). (“There are both strong advocates and harsh critics of the New Third Round Numbers. The
criticisms focus on the fact that there are so many loopholes in the new third round numbers that enable clever
municipalities to effectively avoid the Mount Laurel obligation.").
115 Klein, supra, note 88, at 17-18.
116 62 N.J.A.C. 9:93-2.14, -3.2 (West 2020); see also In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 914 A.2d at 362
(Explaining that in particular, COAH permitted credits and adjustments to reduce a municipalities fa ir share for
affordable housing constructed between 1980 and 1986, for substantial co mpliance, and “for municipalities that
lacked sufficient vacant land or did not ha ve access to water and sewer.”)
117 63 N.J.A.C. 5:93-5.15 (West 2020).
118 Bakewell, supra note 114 at 323.
119 Paula A. Franzese, An Inflection Point for Affordable Housing: The Promise of Inclusionary Mixed-Use
Redevelopment, 52 UIC J. M ARSHALL L. REV. 581, 591 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307(e) (West 2020).
120 Kriston Capps, Putting a Price on NIMBYism, B LOOMBERG C ITYLAB (December 19, 2018)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-19/a-vexed-fix-for-housing-segregation-cap-and-trade/.
(Concentrating low-income housing in neighborhoods with little opportunity was the last thing that the framers of
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of the Mount Laurel doctrine.121 Thus, the RCA’s enabled New Jersey to maintain existing
segregation, utterly defeating the intent of the law.
Finally, in 2007 developers and housing advocates, along with the New Jersey Builders
Association, brought suit to invalidate the Third Round Rules.122 In In re Adoption of N.J.A.C.
5:94 & 5:95, the Appellate Division affirmed portions of COAH’s proposed methodology, but
invalidated other aspects of the Third Round Rules.123 These invalidated aspects included the
“growth share” principle, the RCA’s and other methods by which COAH reduced municipal
housing obligations, on constitutional and other grounds.124
Underscoring the political unpopularity of the doctrine, Gov. Chris Christie made
abolishing COAH a central plank of his gubernatorial campaign in 2009. 125 In 2011 Christie did
just that, and abolished COAH by issuing a reorganization plan (hereinafter the “Plan”) that the
Legislature could have blocked, but didn’t.126 Subsequently, on March 8, 2012, the Appellate
Division invalidated the Plan after the Fair Share Housing Center challenged it in court.127
Nonetheless, because COAH failed to successfully amend the Third Round Rules COAH
remained unequipped to process municipalities' petitions for substantive certifications.128
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Consequently, on March 10, 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared COAH “moribund,”
and once again transferred jurisdiction over Mount Laurel affordable housing issues to specially
selected trial court judges in each vicinage. 129
In Mount Laurel IV, confronted by COAH's prolonged and ultimately unfruitful efforts to
promulgate rules for assessing and identifying municipal compliance with housing obligations, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey (1) recognized COAH to be a nonfunctioning agency; (2) eliminated
the FHA's exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement and reopened the courts to Mount
Laurel litigants; and (3) provided a process by which a town might obtain the equivalent of
substantive certification for its fair share housing plan and avoid exclusionary zoning actions, after
a court assessed the town's fair share responsibility. 130 Two years later the court re-affirmed the
Mount Laurel IV takeover of enforcement in In re Declaratory Judgment Actions Filed By Various
Municipalities.131
IV.

PART III
Over the years the Mount Laurel doctrine has been enforced both through a legislative

scheme that sets up an executive agency which allows municipalities to decide how and where to
permit construction of affordable housing within their boundaries, and a judicial scheme that for
all intents and purposes allows courts to decide how and where affordable housing will be built
within a municipality.

The difference between the two options is glaring. In the former,

municipalities retain their autonomy and are allowed to plan best for the land uses that occur within
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their borders. In the latter, planning is nonexistent; the state’s end goal trumps the mechanics of
achieving it.
Unfortunately, forty years had passed and the underlying issues that led to Mount Laurel I
remained.132 Yet, in the five years since Mount Laurel IV nearly three hundred and fifty towns
have now reached settlements with fair-housing advocates, paving the way for thousands of new
residences.133 Obviously, the judicial “builder’s remedy” has been more effective. But this was
really an emergency remedy, and the need for a holistic solution remains. Indeed, the courts
originally withdrew from the affordable-housing issue when the legislature stepped in, believing
judicial leadership was no longer necessary, but political pressures stalled movement for nearly
fifteen years, forcing the courts to take control once again.
Massachusetts has taken an alternative approach, placing remediation of the affordable
housing problem squarely in the hands of developers with their “Anti-Snob” Zoning Law, Chapter
40B Sec. 21-23.134 Like Mount Laurel, Chapter 40B was also enacted in response to economic
discrimination in housing.135 Chapter 40B allows developers to ignore local zoning in
Massachusetts communities where less than 10 percent of housing is "affordable."136 It allows
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developers in those towns to construct large-scale multifamily projects wherever they wish,
provided that they dedicate twenty-five percent of the new units as affordable housing.137
Much has been written regarding the history of the statute and the curious timing of the
adoption by the Legislature in the wake of Boston’s “forced busing” and the racial crises that
followed.138 Some have hailed the one-size-fits-all statute as an innovative success.

139

However,

it makes no distinction among the state’s unique geologic or topographic regions or among the
state’s cities, suburbs, or relatively rural towns, and that stands in contradiction to sound planning
principles.140 That each and every community—both Boston and Lee, for instance—must attain
the same standard fails to recognize that Boston (population approximately 685,094 in 2017) is
different from Lee (population approximately 2051 in 2010).141 Furthermore, in practice, the
statute “provides a developer with a blank check to build an unlimited number of dwelling units
on a parcel of land zoned for a different use or for a density far different from that proposed.” 142
Surely, 40B is market-driven, and most developers want to build where housing demand is high,
and so while 40B has led the creation of significant affordable housing within the state, it will not
likely be constructed in Massachusetts in any meaningful way.
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Mount Laurel I made clear that the New Jersey Constitution requires each municipality to
bear a reasonable portion of the state’s collective affordable housing burden. The record has shown
that a task as controversial as affordable housing in New Jersey “cannot be handled effectively by
a body subject to political pressures.”143 Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Act provides a good, if
not sad, example of a statute that has simply gone too far in asserting compliance with a state
mandate.144 Until we live in a world of true equality, the judicial solution of Mount Laurel II and
Mount Laurel IV remains the most effective response to economic discrimination in housing and
therefore the best means to eradicate the remnants of de jure racial segregation in our New Jersey
cities and suburbs.

V.

CONCLUSION
At heart, New Jersey's fair-housing laws are not just about building homes. They are also

about expanding ladders of opportunity to the middle class for the many thousands of families
priced out of our state's many thriving communities. The 45-year history of New Jersey's Mount
Laurel doctrine illustrates the difficulty faced in addressing remediating past wrongs such as
exclusionary zoning. When little had been accomplished in the eight years following the Supreme
Court of New Jersey's landmark ruling in Mount Laurel I, the Court's Mount Laurel II ruling, by
allowing a “builder's remedy” and assigning exclusionary zoning challenges to a hand -picked
group of judges, effectively forced the legislature to act. The resulting Fair Housing Act, while
controversial from its inception due to its allowing for Regional Contribution Agreements,
established a workable administrative system for ensuring that local governments met their “fair
share” affordable housing obligations. Over time, however, the Council on Affordable Housing
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(COAH), unable to surmount technical problems and facing political and public opposition, proved
incapable of meeting its obligations under the Fair Housing Act. Finally, in 2015, thirty years after
the legislature had replaced court supervision of municipal “fair share” obligations with the
COAH, the Court found it had no choice but to return the responsibility for overseeing compliance
with the Fair Housing Act to the judiciary. Today, this economic segregation, further aggravated
by gentrification and rising housing costs, has exacerbated the economic class divide. 145 “We are
today faced with a second form of hypersegregation, one based on income rather than race.” 146
Fair and aggressive enforcement of our fair-housing laws provides real opportunities for tens of
thousands of families. As far as we’ve come, there is still more we can do to ensure we take full
advantage of this historic opportunity. Housing remains the major unfinished business of the civil
rights movement.
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